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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SERGIO LLAMAS RODRIGUEZ, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040863-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Petitioner appeals from the dismissal, with prejudice, of his petition for relief 
under the Postconviction Remedies Act (PCRA) challenging his guilty plea to one count 
of attempted sexual abuse of a child, a third degree felony. R. 2, 242. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
la. Assuming that the PCRA's "interests of justice" exception would be satisfied 
if petitioner could show that he was entitled to the benefit of a new rule of constitutional 
law, announced after his case became final: did this Court announce a new rule in State 
v. Rojas-Martinez, by adopting the "commonly recognized" principle that counsel 
performs deficiently by affirmatively misrepresenting the deportation consequences of a 
guilty plea? 
lb. Did petitioner's counsel affirmatively misrepresent the deportation 
consequences of petitioner's plea by stating that petitioner "'might be deported' but that 
[counsel] was not sure"? 
2. Should this Court consider whether the PCRA's "interests of justice" exception 
is satisfied by the allegation of a meritorious claim, when petitioner provides no 
applicable authority or analysis to support that interpretation? 
Standard of Review for issues la, lb, and 2. This Court will "review an appeal 
from an order dismissing or denying petition for post-conviction relief for correctness 
without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law." Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 
UT7,^j4,43P.3d467. 
3a. Should this Court consider petitioner's request for a new rule of constitutional 
law, requiring counsel to always advise of the deportation consequences of a plea, when 
that claim is unpreserved and petitioner fails to argue that any exception to the 
preservation rule applies? 
3b. Can a petitioner ask a court to announce a new rule of constitutional law in a 
postconviction proceeding when the PCRA does not allow a petitioner to seek relief on 
that ground? 
3 c. If this Court reaches the merits of this claim, should it overrule its holding in 
State v. McFadden and adopt the minority rule? 
Standard of Review for issues 3a-3c. Because these issues were not preserved 
below, no standard of review applies. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following relevant constitutional provision and statutes is 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
U.S. CONST, amend. VI 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104 (West 2004) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106 (West 2004) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107 (West 2004) 
CASE AND FACT STATEMENT 
Petitioner Pleads Guilty in the Underlying Criminal Case 
On 28 May 1998 the State charged petitioner with one count of sexual abuse of a 
child, a second degree felony. R. 164-65. On 30 June 1999 petitioner pled guilty to a 
reduced charge of attempted sexual abuse of a child, a third degree felony. R. 166-72. 
Petitioner was represented by Jorge H. Galvez. R. 168. 
On 29 July 1999 petitioner, through Mr. Galvez, filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. R. 173-74. Petitioner then retained new counsel, Mr. Robert M. Archuleta. 
R. 176. On 30 August 1999 Mr. Archuleta filed a second motion to withdraw petitioner's 
guilty plea. R. 178-87. The motion alleged that Mr. Galvez was ineffective because he 
failed to investigate certain witnesses. R. 178-79. It also alleged that petitioner was 
unprepared to enter his plea because he anticipated that the proceeding would only be a 
pre-trial conference, not a plea hearing. R. 179. 
On 8 November 1999 the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on petitioner's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, R. 188, and denied the motion. R. 194. 
3 
Petitioner Requests an Early Release So the INS Can Deport Him to Mexico 
On 14 February 2000 the trial court held a sentencing hearing. R. 196. During 
that hearing, Mr. Archuleta addressed the immigration consequences of petitioner's plea. 
R. 147-48. Mr. Archuleta informed the trial court that he had consulted an immigration 
attorney regarding the deportation consequences of petitioner's plea. R. 147. Mr. 
Archuleta reported that petitioner had pled guilty to an "aggravated felony" as defined by 
federal immigration law and would therefore be deported and barred from reentering the 
United States. R. 147. In light of these consequences, Mr. Archuleta requested the trial 
court to grant petitioner an early release so the INS could deport him and he could begin 
rebuilding his life in Mexico. R. 147. 
The trial court sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate term of zero-to-five years 
at the Utah State Prison. R. 196, 198. However, the trial court suspended the prison 
sentence and placed petitioner on probation on several conditions, including that 
petitioner serve 180 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. R. 197, 198. The trial court also 
ordered that petitioner could "be released early to [INS]." R. 148, 197, 198. 
The judgment and sentence was entered 14 February 2000. R. 198. Petitioner did 
not appeal. 
The Petition for Postconviction Relief 
Sometime after he was deported, petitioner illegally reentered the United States 
and was convicted in federal court of aggravated re-entry of a previously removed alien. 
Aplt Br. at 46. 
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On 13 May 2004 Petitioner filed a petition for relief under the PCRA. R. 1-7. 
Relying on this Court's decision in State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203, 73 P.3d 
967, cert granted, 80 P.3d 152 (Utah 2003), petitioner claimed that Mr. Galvez was 
ineffective because he had affirmatively misrepresented the deportation consequences of 
petitioner's guilty plea. R. 6, 26-28. Petitioner's affidavit asserted that Mr. Galvez told 
him that "that [he] 'might be deported' but that [counsel] was not sure." R. 33. 
Petitioner argued that his petition was timely because it was filed less than one year after 
Rojas-Martinez was issued. R. 29-30. 
The State moved to dismiss the petition as untimely under the PCRA's one-year 
statute oflimitations,UTAHCODEANN. §78-35a-107 (West 2004). R. 199-200. The 
State argued that although the PCRA's statute of limitations provides that a cause of 
action does not accrue until "the date on which petition knew or should have known ... of 
evidentiary facts on which the petition is based," id. at 78-35a-107(2)(e), the decision in 
Rojas-Martinez was not an "evidentiary fact" on which the petition was based. R. 149-
50. In other words, because petitioner's theory was based on newly discovered law, and 
not newly discovered evidence, the PCRA's discovery rule did not render his petition 
timely. R. 149-50. 
Nevertheless, the State conceded that the interests of justice exception to the 
PCRA's statute of limitations would be satisfied if petitioner could demonstrate that 
Rojas-Martinez announced a new rule of constitutional law. R. 150. However, the State 
argued that Rojas-Martinez did not do so. R. 150-52. 
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The postconviction court granted the State's motion and dismissed the petition 
with prejudice. R. 239-42 (a copy of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order 
dismissing the petition is attached as Addendum B). The postconviction court agreed 
that Rojas-Martinez did not announce a new rule, and therefore petitioner had failed to 
satisfy the interests of justice exception. R. 241. The postconviction court also found 
that even if Rojas-Martinez was a new rule, petitioner had not alleged a violation of that 
rule. R. 241. The postconviction court concluded that counsel's advice that petitioner 
"'might be deported' but that [counsel] was not sure," did not affirmatively misrepresent 
the deportation consequences of petitioner's plea. R. 241. 
Petitioner timely appealed. R. 235. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The postconviction court correctly held that petitioner had not satisfied the 
interests of justice exception to the PCRA's statute of limitations. To do so, petitioner 
had to demonstrate that State v. Rojas-Martinez announced a new rule of law. Rojas-
Martinez did not announce a new rule because it was based on an ineffective assistance 
of counsel analysis, which examines counsel's perspective at the time of the challenged 
conduct. Furthermore, this Court recognized that it merely adopted a "commonly 
recognized" exception that counsel performs deficiently by affirmatively misrepresenting 
the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. However, even assuming that Rojas-
Martinez announced a new rule, petitioner failed to allege a violation of that rule. Nor 
can he demonstrate prejudice. 
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II. Petitioner's second claim is unpreserved and this Court should refuse to reach 
it because he does not argue that any exception to the preservation rule should apply. 
Petitioner argues for the first time on appeal that this Court should overrule its holding in 
State v. McFadden, and adopt a new rule requiring counsel to always advise a defendant 
of the collateral deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Petitioner did not argue below 
that the postconviction court should reject McFadden. Rather, petitioner relied on Rojas-
Martinez to claim that he was entitled to relief because his counsel affirmatively 
misrepresented the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. 
Even if petitioner raised this claim below, this Court should not consider it 
because petitioner cannot seek the announcement of a new rule of constitutional law in a 
proceeding under the PCRA. In any event, petitioner's proposed new rule fails on its 
merits. Petitioner has not demonstrated that this Court should overrule its prior precedent 
and adopt the minority rule he proposes. Nor can petitioner demonstrate prejudice under 
his new rule. 
III. Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Utah Supreme Court's opinions in 
Julian v. State and Frausto v. State establish that the "interests of justice" exception to 
the PCRA's statute of limitations is satisfied when a petitioner alleges a meritorious 
claim. Neither Julian nor Frausto interpreted the PCRA's statute of limitations. 
Petitioner offers no other analysis or authority to support his proposed interpretation of 
the "interests of justice" exception. Therefore, this Court should refuse to consider his 
claim. In any event, petitioner failed to allege any meritorious claim. Thus, even under 




In his first issue, petitioner urges this Court to adopt, for the first time in this 
appeal from a collateral postconviction proceeding, a new rule of constitutional law and 
apply it retroactively to him. Aplt. Br. at 9-32. Because petitioner did not raise this issue 
below and the postconviction court did not address it, the State addresses this claim in 
Point II of this brief. 
In his second issue, petitioner contends that the postconviction court erroneously 
rejected the issue that he did raise below: that he satisfied the interests of justice 
exception to the PCRA's statute of limitations because this Court's decision in Rojas-
Martinez announced a new rule of law that should apply retroactively to him. Aplt. Br. at 
32-45. The State addresses this issue in Point I of this brief. 
This Court should also note that although this case presents complex procedural 
issues, this case could be easily resolved on its merits. Even assuming that petitioner 
could surmount the numerous procedural hurdles that prevent this Court from reaching 
the merits of his claims, those claims fail for lack of prejudice. 
"'"Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, he or she must show a "'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, 
he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.55'" 
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^  22, 95 P.3d 276 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 
525 (Utah 1994) (in turn quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, (1985) (alteration in 
original)). 
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Petitioner avers in his petition and affidavit that had he known that his guilty plea 
would result in deportation, he would have insisted on going to trial. R. 34. However, 
the record of his criminal case conclusively disproves his assertion. 
Following his guilty plea, petitioner hired new counsel and filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea based on prior counsel's ineffectiveness. R. 176, 178-87. New 
counsel understood that petitioner had pled guilty to a crime that would render him 
deportable. R. 147. Nevertheless, petitioner never moved to withdraw his plea on the 
ground that prior counsel had misadvised him of the deportation consequences of his 
plea. R. 178-87. On the contrary, petitioner acknowledged that his plea rendered him 
deportable and asked the trial court to grant him an early release so that the INS could 
deport him and he could begin rebuilding his life in Mexico. R. 147. 
On this record, petitioner cannot demonstrate a "reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going 
to trial." Dean, 2004 UT 63, at f 22 (quotations and citations omitted). Knowing that he 
would be deported, petitioner never sought to withdraw his plea on that basis, and even 
requested that the trial court facilitate his deportation. R. 147. Therefore, petitioner 
cannot demonstrate prejudice under either Rojas-Martinez, or the new rule he proposes. 
See Dean, 2004 UT 63 at f 22. Consequently, both of petitioner's claim ultimately fail 
on their merits. 
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I. PETITIONER DID NOT SATISFY THE INTERESTS OF 
JUSTICE EXCEPTION BECAUSE ROJAS-MARTINEZ DID NOT 
ANNOUNCE A NEW RULE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 
ALTERNATIVELY, PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE THAT 
HIS COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE UNDER ROJAS-
IVLiRTINEZ 
Under the PCRA's statute of limitations, petitioner was required to file his petition 
"within one year after the cause of action has accrued." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 5a-
107(1). Because petitioner did not appeal his conviction or sentence, his cause of action 
accrued on "the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction." Id at 78-35a-107(2)(a). 
Petitioner was sentenced 14 February 2000. R. 240. Because 2000 was a leap 
year, the last day that petitioner could have filed a notice of appeal would have been 15 
March 2000. R. 240. Petitioner's postconviction cause of action accrued on 15 March 
2000 and expired on 15 March 2001. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(2)(a). 
Petitioner filed his petition on 13 May 2004. R. 240. Therefore, his petition was 
untimely. See § 78-35a-107(l). 
Petitioner argued below that his petition was timely because he had filed it within 
one year of this Court's decision in State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 2035 73 P.3d 
967, cert granted, 80 P.3d 152 (Utah 2003), holding that trial counsel performs 
deficiently if he affirmatively misrepresents the deportation consequences of a guilty 
plea. R. 29-30. Petitioner misinterpreted the PCRA's statute of limitations. 
The PCRA's statute of limitations does contain a discovery rule, providing that a 
claim does not accrue until "the date on which petition knew or should have known ... of 
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evidentiary facts on which the petition is based." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(2)(e). 
However, the decision in Rojas-Martinez was not an "evidentiary fact" on which the 
petition was based. Therefore, the State argued below that the petition could not be 
timely merely because it was filed within one year of Rojas-Martinez, R. 149-50. 
Nevertheless, the State also acknowledged below that the interests of justice exception to 
the PCRA's statute of limitations would be satisfied if petitioner could demonstrate that 
Rojas-Martinez announced a new rule of constitutional law. R. 150. 
The PCRA's statute of limitations does not explicitly provide that a petition 
seeking the benefit of a new rule of constitutional law is timely if it is filed within one 
year of the decision announcing the new rule. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(2). 
However, it does provide that "a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the 
time limitations" if the court finds "that the interests of justice require." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-35a-107(3). The interests of justice exception would be satisfied if petitioner 
could demonstrate that a case, decided after his conviction became final, announced a 
new rule of constitutional law that should apply retroactively. 
The interests of justice exception should apply in such a situation, because a 
petitioner should be able to obtain the benefit of a new retroactive rule of constitutional 
law regardless of how much time has elapsed since his conviction became final. Under 
the PCRA, a petitioner may obtain relief if his "conviction was obtained or [his] sentence 
was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104(l)(a) (West 2004). It also states that u[t]he question of whether 
a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule announced by the United States Supreme 
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Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after the petitioner's conviction 
became final shall be governed by applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104(2). Therefore, if the United States Supreme Court, or a 
Utah appellate court, announces a new retroactive rule of constitutional law after a 
defendant's conviction becomes final, then that defendant could seek relief under the 
PCRA on the ground that his "conviction was obtained ... in violation of the United 
States Constitution or Utah Constitution." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104(l)(a). 
The PCRA's statute of limitations should never bar such a claim. Therefore, if the 
decision announcing a new retroactive rule is issued more than one year after a 
defendant's conviction becomes final, then the interests of justice exception should apply. 
A. Rojas-Martinez did not announce a new rule. 
The interests of justice would not be satisfied when a petitioner seeks the benefit 
of a rule that was available when his conviction became final. If a rule was available 
when a defendant's conviction became final, then that defendant could have obtained the 
benefit of that rule in his trial or appeal, had he raised the issue. Under the PCRA, a 
petitioner cannot seek relief based upon a ground that "could have been but was not 
raised at trial or on appeal." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106(l)(c) (West 2004). 
Therefore, a petitioner cannot base his postconviction claim on a case that simply relies 
on an established rule that he also could have relied on at his trial. See id. 
Petitioner acknowledges that to proceed on his claim, he must satisfy the interests 
of justice exception to the PCRA's statute of limitations. Aplt. Br. at 32-45. He contends 
that he has satisfied the exception because Rojas-Martinez announced a new rule of 
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constitutional law that should be retroactively applied to him. Aplt. Br. at 32-45. 
However, the postconviction court found that this Court did not announce a new rule. R. 
241. The postconviction court was correct. 
1. Rojas-Martinez did not announce a new rule because the 
decision was announced in the context of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 
The decision in Rojas-Martinez did not announce a new rule because its holding 
was based on ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. When a court analyzes an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it must do so based on the law in effect at the 
time. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (U.S. 2003) (explaining that counsel's 
challenged conduct must be evaluated '"from counsel's perspective at the time'") 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)); see also State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993) ("To establish a claim of ineffectiveness based on an 
oversight... a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating why, on the basis of the law 
in effect at the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's performance was deficient"). 
Counsel's performance cannot be deficient, under the first prong of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel test, unless his conduct "fall[s] below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." See Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31,120, 94 P.3d 211 (quotations and 
citations omitted). Counsel's failure to comply with a new, not yet announced rule could 
never be objectively unreasonable. Cf. Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052 (10th Cir. 
2002) (courts "have rejected ineffective assistance claims where a defendant 'faults his 
former counsel not for failing to find existing law, but for failing to predict future law' 
and have warned 'that clairvoyance is not a required attribute of effective 
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representation'" (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 71 F.3d 1537, 1542 (10th Cir. 
1995)). Therefore, when an issue is analyzed under an ineffective assistance of counsel 
analysis, the result of that analysis could never be a new rule. 
The Rojas-Martinez opinion illustrates this principle. In that case, this Court 
found that counsel's performance was "objectively unreasonable" because counsel failed 
to comply with already established legal standards. See 2003 UT App 203 at fflf 8-10. 
This Court did not fault counsel for failing to satisfy a previously undefined rule. See id. 
Therefore, because Rojas-Martinez was decided under an ineffective assistance of 
counsel analysis, it did not announce a new rule. 
2. Rojas-Martinez did not announce a new rule because it 
applied an established legal standard of general applicability. 
Petitioner contends that under federal precedent, Rojas-Martinez announced a new 
rule because the rule was not "dictated by prior precedent." Aplt. Br. at 36-40. On the 
contrary, federal precedent establishes that Rojas-Martinez's application of Strickland's 
well-established and generally applicable ineffective assistance of counsel standard did 
not announce a new rule. 
When a case involves a rule of general applicability such as the ineffective 
assistance of counsel standard, "case law need not exist on all fours to allow for a finding 
... that the rule at issue was dictated by [prior] precedent." Lewis v. Johnson, 359 F.3d 
646, 655 (3rd Cir. 2004). "Where the beginning point is a rule of this general application, 
a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will 
be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not 
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dictated by precedent." Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 309 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
For example, in Lewis, the Third Circuit analyzed whether the rule announced in 
Roe v. Flores-Ortgea, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), "holding that criminal defense attorneys have 
a constitutional duty to consult and advise defendants of their appellate rights," was a 
new rule, or whether it was "dictated by precedent clearly established at the time Lewis's 
conviction became final." 359 F.3d at 652, 654. The Third Circuit concluded that the 
rule "was dictated by precedent and merely clarified the law as it applied to the particular 
facts of that case." Id. at 655. Therefore, Flores-Ortgea did not announce a new rule. 
Id. at 657. 
In reaching this holding, the Third Circuit observed that Flores-Ortega applied the 
Strickland standard to the question of whether an attorney is deficient for failing to file a 
notice of appeal when a defendant gives no specific instructions regarding his desire to 
appeal. Id. at 654. The court noted that "Strickland is a rule of general applicability 
which asks whether counsel's conduct was objectively reasonable and conformed to 
professional norms based 'on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of 
counsel's conduct.'" Id. at 655 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 
(1984) (emphasis supplied by the Third Circuit)). The court also recognized that 
Strickland "'provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claims.'" Id. (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)). The 
Third Circuit also relied on Justice Kennedy's conclusion that "'[i]f the rule in question is 
one which of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence, then we can 
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tolerate a number of specific applications without saying that those applications 
themselves create a new rule.5" Id. (quoting Wright, 505 U.S. at 308 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)), 
As in Lewis, Rojas-Martinez's application of the Strickland standard did not 
announce a "new" rule. The Stricklandtwo-part standard for evaluating counsel's 
performance was announced in 1984, long before petitioner's conviction became final in 
2000. See Sfrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 668 (1984). In Rojas-Martinez, this 
Court merely applied the Strickland standard to counsel's advice regarding the 
deportation consequences of a guilty plea. See 2003 UT App 203 at <[flj 6, 10 (recognizing 
that Strickland governed the issue, and holding that counsel's advice amounted to 
deficient performance under Strickland's first prong). Rojas-Martinez }s application of 
Strickland did not announce a new rule, rather it "merely clarified the law as it applied to 
the particular facts of that case." See Lewis, 359 F.3d at 655, Consequently, Rojas-
Martinez did not announce a "new" rule. 
This conclusion is supported by language in Rojas-Martinez itself. This Court 
observed that it was merely adopting "a commonly recognized exception" to the rule that 
an attorney need not inform his client of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea. 
2003 UT App 203 at f^ 8 (emphasis added). In fact, nearly five years before petitioner 
pled guilty, this Court recognized in State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1305 n.3 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994), that some courts had held that defense counsel performs deficiently by 
affirmatively misrepresenting the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. However, 
this Court did not adopt the "affirmative misrepresentation" rule because McFadden's 
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counsel gave no advice regarding deportation, and therefore the issue was not properly 
before the Court. See id. Nevertheless, this Court did not state, or even imply, that Utah 
would never adopt the "affirmative misrepresentation" rule. See id. 
Petitioner acknowledged below that he could have relied on McFadden's footnote 
to assert this claim in 1999. In his memorandum supporting his petition he stated, 
"[g]ranted [petitioner] could have forged a new road back in 1999 by arguing in the 
evidentiary hearing that the dicta in McFadden, should be adopted as law in Utah, but 
failure to create precedent should not bar relief under the [PCRA]." R. 30. On the 
contrary, petitioner's failure to raise the generally-applicable Strickland standard, and 
seek the benefit of a "commonly recognized" exception that this Court had previously 
acknowledged, does indeed preclude his current claim. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 5a-
106(l)(c) (barring relief on any claim that "could have been but was not raised at trial or 
on appeal"). 
Petitioner argues that "the adoption of the collateral consequences doctrine in 
McFadden meant that affirmative misadvice on the deportation consequences of pleading 
guilty probably did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." Aplt. Br. at 39 
(emphasis added). This argument misconstrues McFadden. This Court did not suggest 
that an affirmative misrepresentation could not satisfy Strickland's deficient performance 
prong. If anything, this Court's acknowledgement of the "affirmative misrepresentation" 
exception in a case in which the exception was clearly inapplicable, suggested that the 
Court would be willing to adopt the exception in an appropriate case. See McFadden, 
884 P.2dat 1305 n.3. History supports this conclusion. This Court adopted the 
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"affirmative misrepresentation" exception to McFadden 's rule in the first case in which it 
had the opportunity. See Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203 at \ 8. 
Petitioner also argues that Rojas-Martinez announced a new rule because it was a 
case of first impression. Aplt. Br. at 37. However, cases of first impression do not 
necessarily announce new rules. As discussed above, a case does not announce a new 
rule when it applies a generally applicable standard to a new set of facts. See Lewis, 359 
F.3d at 655; Wright, 505 U.S. at 308-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Otherwise, an 
appellate court would announce a new rule every time it applied a generally applicable 
standard—such as Strickland, or the standards governing search and seizure law—to a 
new set of facts. Rojas-Martinez was a case of first impression because it involved a set 
of facts never before analyzed by a Utah appellate court. However, it did not announce a 
new rule because it relied on the generally applicable and well-established Strickland 
standard to evaluate those facts. See id, 
"[Rojas-Martinez's] application of the Strickland standard was dictated by 
precedent and merely clarified the law as it applied to the particular facts of that case." 
Lewis, 359 F.3d at 655. Therefore, Rojas-Martinez did not announce a new rule. 
Because petitioner did not seek the benefit of a new rule, and made no other attempt to 
satisfy the interests of justice exception, the postconviction court correctly concluded that 
the "interests of justice" did not excuse petitioner's untimely filing. R. 241. 
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B. Even assuming that Rojas-Martinez announced a new rule that 
should apply retroactively, petitioner failed to allege a violation 
of that rule. 
1. Petitioner did not allege that his counsel affirmatively 
misrepresented the deportation consequences of his plea. 
Assuming arguendo that Rojas-Martinez announced a new rule that should apply 
retroactively, the postconviction court correctly dismissed the petition because petitioner 
failed to allege a violation of that rule. Petitioner alleged that his counsel affirmatively 
misadvised him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea because counsel told 
him that he "'might be deported' but that [counsel] was not sure." R. 33 (a copy of 
petitioner's affidavit is attached as Addendum D); 240. The postconviction court 
correctly found that this was not an affirmative misrepresentation. R. 241. 
Counsel's advice represented nothing, other than that counsel "was not sure" what 
the deportation consequences of petitioner's plea might be. R. 33; 240. Counsel's 
statement was the equivalent of saying "I don't know." Such a reply makes no 
representation, let alone an "affirmative misrepresentation" about possible deportation 
consequences. 
Petitioner argues that there is a fact issue regarding whether counsel said "You 
might be deported, but I don't know," or simply, "You might be deported." Aplt. Br. at 
33. Petitioner asserts that, although his affidavit stated that his counsel told him he might 
be deported but counsel was not sure, his wife's affidavit stated that counsel merely said 
that petitioner might be deported. Aplt. Br. at 33; R. 33 (petitioner's affidavit), 36 (wife's 
affidavit) (a copy of this affidavit is attached as Addendum E). Petitioner's attempt to 
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create a factual issue by comparing two different affidavits that he submitted in support 
of his petition is unavailing. 
Petitioner misrepresents the contents of his wife's affidavit. Petitioner's wife 
avers that "[she] was present on June 30, 1999 when Mr. Galvez told [petitioner] that 
[petitioner] 'might' be deported for pleading guilty...." R. 36. Unlike the statement in 
petitioner's affidavit, petitioner's wife never represented that she was asserting her 
recollection of the advice that counsel gave petitioner. At best, the statement merely 
establishes that petitioner's wife was present when petitioner asked his counsel about the 
possibility of deportation. Moreover, petitioner's wife never stated that defense counsel 
did not also state that he "was not sure" what the deportation consequences of petitioner's 
plea would be. R. 35-36. 
As the postconviction court recognized, petitioner had an opportunity in his 
petition, and his affidavit, to allege his best recollection of his counsel's advice. R. 245: 
26. That recollection was that his counsel told him that "he 'might be deported,' but that 
[counsel] wasn't sure." R. 240. As the postconviction court correctly concluded, this 
represents nothing other than that counsel was not sure what the deportation 
consequences could be. 
Petitioner now attempts to clarify that his counsel really meant "that [petitioner] 
might be deported, but that [counsel] was unsure as to whether [petitioner] would actually 
be deported." Aplt. Br. at 34. Although petitioner may now allege that this is what he 
understood his counsel to mean, it does not change the substance of counsel's actual 
advice. Petitioner's opportunity to allege the facts supporting his claims was when he 
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drafted, with the assistance of counsel, his petition and affidavit. The facts he alleged did 
not establish an affirmative misrepresentation. 
In sum, even assuming that Rojas-Martinez announced a new retroactive rule, the 
postconviction court correctly dismissed the petition because petitioner failed to allege a 
violation of that rule. 
2. Petitioner cannot establish prejudice. 
As explained above, even assuming that counsel affirmatively misrepresented the 
deportation consequences of petitioner's plea, petitioner cannot establish prejudice. The 
record of petitioner's criminal case establishes that although he knew that he would be 
deported, petitioner never sought to withdraw his plea on that basis, and even requested 
that the trial court facilitate his deportation by allowing him to be released early to the 
INS. R. 147. Given those facts, petitioner cannot demonstrate a "reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial." See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 22, 95 P.3d 276 (quotations and 
citations omitted). Therefore, petitioner's claim ultimately fails for lack of prejudice. 
II. PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR A NEW RULE IS 
UNPRESERVED; IN ANY EVENT, A COURT CANNOT 
ANNOUNCE A NEW RULE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A 
POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDING; EVEN IF IT COULD, 
PETITIONER HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THIS 
COURT SHOULD OVERRULE ITS PRIOR PRECEDENT AND 
ADOPT THE MINORITY RULE 
Petitioner asks this Court to overrule its prior precedent and join the minority of 
jurisdictions by adopting a new rule requiring defense counsel to always advise 
defendants of the collateral deportation consequences of a guilty plea (the "always 
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advise" rule). Aplt. Br. at 9-32. This Court should not consider the merits of this claim 
because it is unpreserved and petitioner has not argued that "plain error" occurred or 
"exceptional circumstances" exist. Even absent petitioner's waiver, this Court should not 
consider the merits of this claim because petitioner cannot seek the announcement of a 
new rule for the first time in a proceeding under the PCRA. In any event, petitioner has 
not demonstrated that this Court should overrule its prior precedent and adopt the always 
advise rule. Nor can petitioner demonstrate prejudice under this rule. 
A. This Court should not consider petitioner's claim because it is 
unpreserved and he has not argued that any exception to the 
preservation rule should apply. 
Petitioner's request for the announcement of a new rule is unpreserved because he 
did not raise this issue below. Petitioner argues that he preserved this claim during oral 
argument on the State's motion to dismiss, when he asserted that defense counsel have 
"an affirmative duty" to inform defendants about the immigration consequences of their 
pleas. Aplt. Br. at 1 (citing R. 245:18) (a copy of the transcript of the argument on the 
State's motion to dismiss is included as Addendum C). Petitioner did not preserve this 
issue by merely alluding to it during oral argument on the State's motion to dismiss. 
"Tn order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.'" 438 
Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, If 51, 99 P.3d 801 (quoting Brookside Mobile 
Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, If 14, 48 P.3d 968) (additional citation 
omitted)). "For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error '(1) the 
issue must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] and 
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(3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority.'" Id. (alterations in original). 
Petitioner did not give the postconviction court an opportunity to rule on this issue. 
Petitioner has been represented by counsel throughout his postconviction proceeding. 
Petitioner never alleged in his petition, or his memorandum supporting his petition, that 
the postconviction court should disregard this Court's prior precedent and adopt a new 
rule requiring defense counsel to affirmatively advise defendants of the deportation 
consequences of a guilty plea. R. 6, 22-31. Rather, petitioner's only claim was that his 
counsel was ineffective under this Court's holding in State v. Rojas-Martinez, because he 
"affirmatively misrepresented" the immigration consequences of petitioner's guilty plea. 
R. 26-30. Moreover, petitioner never moved to amend his petition to allege the claim that 
he now raises. 
At oral argument on the State's motion to dismiss, petitioner's counsel affirmed 
that he was relying on Rojas-Martinez and proceeding under the theory that counsel had 
"affirmatively misrepresented" the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. R. 245: 
9-10, 20-22. Counsel argued, "Rojas-Martinez did announce a new rule ... [that] should 
be applied retroactively to save [petitioner's] case." R. 245: 9-10. 
It was not until the postconviction court questioned whether the alleged advice 
even fit within the definition of an "affirmative misrepresentation" that petitioner's 
counsel suggested that trial counsel had an affirmative duty to fully advise of deportation 
consequences. R. 245:17-18. The postconviction court asked petitioner's counsel 
whether an attorney "affirmatively misrepresents" the deportation consequences of a plea 
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if, when asked whether the plea will render the client deportable, the attorney simply 
responds, "I don't know." R. 245: 17. At that point, petitioner's counsel argued, for the 
first time, that trial counsel has "a duty to provide that information" when asked. R. 245: 
17. 
When the postconviction court asked counsel how he could assert that such an 
affirmative duty existed in light of this Court's holding in Rojas-Martinez, counsel 
responded, "I get that from Rojas-Martinez because Rojas-Martinez says, 'you might or 
might not be deported.'" R. 245: 17. Petitioner's counsel also argued that the ABA 
standards for criminal justice require defense counsel to advise a client who wishes to 
plead guilty of the possible collateral consequences. R. 245: 19-20. 
Counsel reaffirmed, however, that he was grounding his argument in Rojas-
Martinez. R. 245: 20-22. After quoting extensively from Rojas-Martinez, counsel 
explained, "by not providing [a defendant] with that information, you have affirmatively 
misstated the law." R. 245: 22 (emphasis added). 
Although counsel alluded to this new argument below, he never raised the issue 
with sufficient specificity to allow the postconviction court to rule on it. See 438 Main 
Street, 2004 UT 72 at |^ 51. As the above discussion illustrates, counsel never clearly 
articulated the claim he now raises. Rather, counsel alluded to this claim as an 
afterthought, in response to the postconviction court's concern that petitioner's 
allegations did not allege an affirmative misrepresentation. 
Moreover, petitioner's counsel did not provide the postconviction court with any 
of the authority that he now presents this Court. Petitioner never acknowledged below 
24 
that his proposed new rule is directly contrary to this Court's controlling precedent 
holding that "counsel's performance is not deficient by the mere failure to apprise a 
noncitizen defendant that entry of a guilty plea might subject defendant to deportation." 
State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT 
App 203 at Tf 7. Counsel never provided the postconviction court with any authority that 
would justify ignoring this controlling precedent. 
In sum, although petitioner alluded to his claim during the hearing on the State's 
motion to dismiss, he did not raise it specifically, nor did he provide any legal support for 
his claim. Petitioner did not present this claim "in such a way that the [postconviction] 
court had an opportunity to rule on th[e] issue"; therefore, the claim is unpreserved. See 
438 Main Street, 2004 UT 72 at lj 51. 
This Court should not consider this unpreserved claim. "'Under ordinary 
circumstances, [Utah courts] will not consider an issue brought for the first time on 
appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or exceptional circumstances exist." 
State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (quoting State v. Nelson-
Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, If 16, 94 P.3d 186). "When aparty seeks review of an 
unpreserved [issue], [Utah courts] require that the party articulate an appropriate 
justification for appellate review." Id. (citing State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n. 5 
(Utah 1995)). Utah courts "have also required the party seeking appellate review in such 
a situation to articulate the justification for review in the party's opening brief." Id. 
(citing Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, If 9, 17 P.3d 1122). Petitioner does not assert 
that "plain error" occurred, nor that "exceptional circumstances" exist. Consequently, 
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this Court should not review his unpreserved claim. See id. (refusing to consider an 
unpreserved issue "[b]ecause Pinder has failed to argue plain error or show exceptional 
circumstances on appeal"). 
B. The PCRA does not allow a petitioner to seek the announcement 
of a new rule. 
The PCRA allows a petitioner to seek relief on five grounds. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-35a-104(l) (West 2004). None of those grounds allows a petitioner to seek 
the announcement of a new rule for the first time in postconviction proceedings. See id. 
A petitioner is entitled to relief under the PCRA on the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of 
the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which 
the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was 
revoked in an unlawful manner; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to 
vacate the conviction or sentence. 
Id. 
A petitioner could not claim that a proposed new rule of constitutional law would 
entitle him to relief under subsections (a) through (c), allowing a petitioner to challenge 
an unconstitutional conviction or unlawful sentence, because such a claim would be 
procedurally barred. If a defendant believes that a new rule is constitutionally required, 
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then that defendant can raise that claim in his criminal trial. The PCRA precludes relief 
on any ground that "could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106(l)(c). Therefore, a petitioner cannot argue, for the first time in 
a collateral proceeding under the PCRA, that a court should announce a new rule of 
constitutional law. See id. 
Nor would subsection (d), providing for a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, allow petitioner to seek the announcement of a new rule in a postconviction 
proceeding. As explained above, a court must assess counsel's performance based on the 
law in effect at the time. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (U.S. 2003) 
(explaining that counsel's challenged conduct must be evaluated '"from counsel's 
perspective at the time'") (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)); 
see also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993) ("To establish a claim of 
ineffectiveness based on an oversight... a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating 
why, on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's 
performance was deficient"). Because counsel's performance is evaluated based on that 
law that was in effect at the time of trial, a petitioner could not claim that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to argue that a court should announce a new rule of constitutional 
law. See Murray v. Carrier, All U.S. 478, 486 (1986) ("[T]he constitution guarantees 
criminal defendants only a fair trial and a competent attorney. It does not insure that 
defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional claim"). 
Finally, a petitioner could not use subsection (e), providing for a claim based on 
newly discovered evidence, to seek the announcement of a new rule. By its own terms, 
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subsection (e) only applies to claims based on "newly discovered material evidence." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104(l)(e). 
As discussed above, the PCRA allows a petitioner to seek the benefit of a new 
retroactive rule of constitutional law that is announced in a case decided after his 
conviction became final. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104(2). The PCRA provides 
that "[t]he question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule announced 
by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after 
the petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by applicable state and federal 
principles of retroactivity." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104(2). However, this provision 
applies only to a rule announced in a case that is decided "after the petitioner's 
conviction became final." Id. (emphasis added). This provision does not allow a 
petitioner to seek a new rule for the first time in a proceeding under the PCRA. 
No ground for relief under the PCRA would allow petitioner to seek the 
announcement of a new rule of constitutional law for the first time in a postconviction 
proceeding. Therefore, even if petitioner had preserved this issue below, it does not state 
a claim for relief under the PCRA. 
C. In any event, this Court should not overrule its prior holdings 
that follow the majority rule, and adopt the minority rule. 
Even assuming that petitioner could raise this claim under the PCRA, he has not 
demonstrated that this Court should adopt the always advise rule. Before petitioner can 
persuade this Court to adopt his rule, petitioner must convince this Court that it should 
overrule its prior holding in State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1994), which this Court reaffirmed in State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203, f 8, 73 
P.3d 967. In both of these cases this Court recognized that "counsel's performance is not 
deficient by the mere failure to apprise a noncitizen defendant that entry of a guilty plea 
might subject defendant to deportation." McFadden, 884 P.2d at 1305; see also Rojas-
Martinez, 2003 UT App 203 at 17 (reaffirming this rule). 
To demonstrate that this Court should overrule these prior decisions, petitioner 
must demonstrate that the decisions are "'clearly erroneous or conditions have changed 
so as to render the prior decision[s] inapplicable.'" State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 
(Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Dungan, 718 P.2d 1010, 1014 (1986)). Petitioner has not 
satisfied either requirement. 
Petitioner has not shown that this Court's prior decisions were "clearly erroneous." 
In McFadden, this Court "follow[ed] the majority rule ... that counsel's performance is 
not deficient by the mere failure to apprise a noncitizen defendant that entry of a guilty 
plea might subject defendant to deportation." 884 P.2d at 1305. This rule remains the 
"overwhelming majority" rule, even after the amendments to federal immigration law 
that petitioner cites. See State v. Zarate, 651 N.W.2d 215, 222 (Neb. 2002) ("The 
overwhelming majority of courts ... have held that... failure to advise the defendant of 
the possibility of deportation does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel"). A 
rule that has been adopted by an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions cannot be 
"clearly erroneous." See Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399. Petitioner fails to demonstrate 
otherwise. 
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Nor has petitioner shown that "conditions have changed so as to render the prior 
decision[s] inapplicable." See id. Federal immigration laws are indeed more strict than 
when this Court decided McFadden. But they are not more strict than when this Court 
decided Rojas-Martinez. In that case, this Court reaffirmed McFadden even after 
acknowledging the changes to federal immigration law. See 2003 UT App 203 at f 7. 
Moreover, whatever policy reasons may support petitioner's proposed rule, 
petitioner fails to demonstrate that the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution 
requires defense counsel to advise defendants regarding collateral deportation 
consequences.1 The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the effective assistance of 
counsel in "criminal prosecutions." U.S. CONST, amend. VI. This guarantee "does not 
extend to collateral aspects of the prosecution." Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357, 
1358 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 
1989)); see also, In re: Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171, 1184 (Cal. 2001) ("We are not persuaded 
that the Sixth Amendment imposes a blanket obligation on defense counsel... to 
investigate immigration consequences or research immigration law"). 
Changes in immigration law have not transformed deportation from a collateral to 
a direct consequence of a guilty plea. In fact, petitioner does not even argue that 
deportation should now be considered a direct consequence of a plea. As this Court held 
1
 Petitioner relies exclusively on the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Aplt. Br. at 11. Because petitioner does not raise a separate argument 
under the Utah Constitution, this Court should consider only his federal claim. See State 
v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5 (Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we will not engage 
in state constitutional analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the state 
and federal constitutions is briefed"). 
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in McFadden, "[a] collateral consequence is one that is not related to the length or nature 
of the sentence imposed on the basis of the plea." 884 P.2d at 1304 (citing Kincade v. 
United States, 559 F.2d 906, 909 (3rd Cir. 1977)). The Tenth Circuit has defined a 
"collateral consequence" as one which "'remains beyond the control and responsibility of 
the district court in which that conviction was entered.'" Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 
1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 
2000)). Whether a defendant will be deported is determined by a judicial system and 
body of laws completely separate and distinct from Utah's criminal justice system, and 
over which Utah authorities lack any control. "State courts have no more control over 
whether a criminal defendant will be deported today than they did prior to the 1996 
[amendments to federal immigration law]. Accordingly, deportation remains a collateral 
consequence of a criminal conviction." Id. at 1257. 
Because deportation remains a collateral consequence, petitioner has failed to 
show that the Sixth Amendment requires this Court to adopt the rule he proposes. 
Therefore, even assuming that petitioner could proceed on this issue, he has not 
demonstrated that this Court should overrule its prior precedent and adopt the minority 
rule he proposes. 
D. Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice even under his 
proposed new rule. 
Even assuming that this Court should adopt the always advise rule, and that 
petitioner's counsel was deficient under this new rule, petitioner cannot establish 
prejudice. As explained above, petitioner cannot demonstrate a "reasonable probability 
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that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial." See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 22, 95 P.3d 276 (quotations and 
citations omitted). Therefore, petitioner's claim ultimately fails for lack of prejudice. 
III. PETITIONER PROVIDES NO CONTROLLING AUTHORITY 
OR ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATING THAT THE "INTERESTS 
OF JUSTICE" EXCEPTION IS SATISFIED WHENEVER A 
PETITIONER ASSERTS A MERITORIOUS CLAIM 
Petitioner argues that "[t]he Utah Supreme Court has developed [a] meritorious 
claim exception to the [PCRA's] statute of limitations through the 'interests of justice' 
exception." Aplt. Br. at 46. Relying entirely on the Utah Supreme Court's holdings in 
Julian v. State and Frausto v. State, petitioner argues that a postconviction petition "may 
only be dismissed if it fails to raise a meritorious claim." Aplt. Br. at 45. Petitioner's 
claim fails because Julian and Frausto do not establish that the allegation of a 
meritorious claim satisfies the "interests of justice" exception. Petitioner fails to offer 
any other reason why this Court should interpret the "interests of justice" exception as he 
proposes. In any event, as explained above, neither of petitioner's claims are meritorious 
A. Neither Julian nor Frausto supports petitioner's interpretation 
of the "interests of justice" exception. 
The Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the "interests of justice" exception in 
Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998), does not control, because Julian was not a 
proceeding under the PCRA; rather it was a proceeding seeking common law 
"extraordinary relief... pursuant to rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. 
The constitutionality of the PCRA's statute of limitations, and the meaning of 
the "interests of justice" exception, is currently before the Utah Supreme Court in Adams 
v. State, 20040722-SC. The State's brief of appellee in that case is due 6 April 2004. 
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at 250. Julian filed his petition in 1995, prior to the enactment of the PCRA. See id. 
Therefore, the PCRA did not control. 
Although the Supreme Court cited the PCRA's statute of limitations (section 78-
3 5a-107) in Julian, it noted that the statute that the lower court relied on was actually the 
former section 78-12-31.1. See id. at 251 n.4. This section was amended and 
renumbered as section 78-35a-107 when the PCRA was enacted. See id.; UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-35a-107. Because Julian's petition was filed before the PCRA was even 
enacted, section 78-12-31.1, not the PCRA's statute of limitations, was at issue. See id. 
The distinction between the two statutes is significant. 
Section 78-12-31.1 placed a one-year statute of limitations on petitions "pursuant 
to Rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-31.1 (1995). 
As noted, a petition under this rule sought relief in the form of a common law 
extraordinary writ. See Julian, 966 P.2d at 250. 
In contrast, the PCRA "replaced prior post-conviction remedies with a statutory, 
'substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a 
criminal offense.'" Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61, If 4, 52 P.3d 1168 (quoting UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-35a-102)). Therefore, the PCRA replaced the common law collateral review 
at issue in Julian, with a statutory legal remedy. 
Common law extraordinary remedies are fundamentally different from statutory 
legal remedies. In fact, they are mutually exclusive. See, e.g., State v. Gee, 514 P.2d 
809, 811 (Utah 1973) (holding that Gee was not entitled to extraordinary relief in the 
form of a writ of error coram nobis because the Legislature had provided a legal remedy). 
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"[I]t is only when the defendant is wholly without remedy that the common law provides 
one." Id. Consequently, language interpreting a statute of limitations that restricted 
access to a common law extraordinary writ, is inapplicable to a statute of limitations that 
restricts access to a statutory legal remedy. 
Relying on the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 
1033-34 (Utah 1989), petitioner argues that a petition under the PCRA is the modern 
equivalent of a petition for extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of habeas corpus. 
Aplt. Br. at 46. In Hurst, the Utah Supreme Court stated in dicta that "the writ of habeas 
corpus has ... absorbed the post-conviction relief remedy to form a single constitutional 
remedy." 777 P.2d at 1033. However, the postconviction remedy that the Utah Supreme 
Court contemplated in Hurst was not the remedy provided by the PCRA. The PCRA was 
not enacted until 1996, nearly seven years after Hurst was decided. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-35a-101 (West 2004). Therefore, Hurst does not establish that language 
interpreting restrictions on a common law remedy also governs restrictions on the 
PCRA's legal remedy. 
Petitioner also notes that he is serving an increased sentence for aggravated reentry 
of a previously removed alien based on the state conviction he challenges. Aplt. Br. at 
46. However, petitioner fails to explain how that fact makes Julian's language 
interpreting restrictions on a common law remedy applicable to restrictions on the 
PCRA's legal remedy. 
A petition under the PCRA is not simply a writ of habeas corpus brought under a 
new label. Therefore, Julian's interpretation of the "interests of justice" exception in the 
34 
prior section 78-12-31.1, limiting a common law extraordinary remedy, does not apply to 
the PCRA's section 78-35a-107, limiting a statutory legal remedy. 
Nor does Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998), control the interpretation of 
the "interests of justice" exception. Less than two months after Julian, the Utah Supreme 
Court had the opportunity to directly address the PCRA's statute of limitations in 
Frausto. See id. at 850. When the Julian author repeated his interpretation that the 
"interests of justice" exception precluded time-barring any meritorious claim, only one 
justice joined in that opinion. See id. at 851, 852. The three remaining justices concurred 
only in the result: a remand to consider the "interests of justice" exception. Id. at 852. 
Therefore, Frausto's plurality opinion does not control. 
Other than relying on Julian and Frausto, petitioner presents no analysis or 
authority explaining why this Court should now adopt the interpretation of the "interests 
of justice" exception that he proposes. Aplt. Br. at 45-48. Therefore, his claim fails. 
See, e.g., State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, Tf 61 n.7, 57 P.3d 977 (declining to adopt a state 
constitutional rule in a capital case where Honie failed to demonstrate in any "meaningful 
fashion" how the state constitution should be interpreted to reach that result). 
B. Alternatively, petitioner has not alleged a meritorious claim. 
Alternatively, assuming arguendo that the "interests of justice" exception is 
satisfied when a petitioner asserts a meritorious claim, petitioner fails to satisfy the 
exception. As explained above, even assuming that Rojas-Martinez announced a new 
rule, petitioner has not alleged a meritorious claim because he did not allege that his 
counsel affirmatively misrepresented the deportation consequences of his plea. 
35 
Furthermore, petitioner's claim seeking the announcement of the always advise rule lacks 
merit because the claim is unpreserved, and, in any event, the PCRA does not allow him 
to pursue such a claim. Even assuming that petitioner could demonstrate that his counsel 
performed deficiently under either rule petitioner proposes, he cannot demonstrate 
prejudice. Therefore, even under his interpretation, petitioner has not satisfied the 
interests of justice exception because neither of his claim are meritorious. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the dismissal of the untimely petition. 
Respectfully submitted / April 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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U.S. CONST, amend. VI. 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... have the assistance of 
counsel for his defence." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104 (West 2004) Grounds for relief—Retroactivity of 
rule 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has 
been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the 
district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or 
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of 
the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which 
the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was 
revoked in an unlawful manner; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to 
vacate the conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the 
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the 
evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction 
proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that 
was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered 
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could 
have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the 
sentence received. 
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule 
announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah 
Court of Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be 
governed by applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106 (West 2004) Preclusion of relief—Exception 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction 
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-
conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a 
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if 
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107 (West 2004) Statute of limitations for postconviction 
relief 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year 
after the cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the 
following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction 
over the case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah 
Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ 
of certiorari is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of 
the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of 
certiorari is filed; or 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise 
of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based. 
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a 
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations. 
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This matter came before the Court on 17 September 2004 for argument on the State's motion 
to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was not present but appeared through 
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D. Ballard. The Court has reviewed the petition, the State's motion to dismiss, the memoranda filed 
in support of and in opposition to the motion, and has also heard argument from both parties. Now 
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being fully advised in the premises, the Court enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and order dismissing the petition. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner was sentenced on 14 February 2000. 
2. He did not file an appeal. 
3. The last day he could have filed a notice of appeal was 15 March 2000. See Utah R. App. 
P. 4(a). 
4. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(2)(c), petitioner's post-conviction cause of 
action accrued 15 March 2000, and expired one year later on 15 March 2001. 
5. Petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief on 13 May 2004. 
6. Petitioner alleges that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance that adversely affected his guilty plea when counsel advised him that if he pled 
guilty he '"might be deported' but that [counsel] was not sure." 
7. Petitioner contends that pursuant to section 78-3 5a-107(3), the "interests of justice" 
exception should excuse his untimely filing because his claim is based on the court of appeals' 
opinion in State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203, 73 P.3d 967. According to petitioner, Rojas-
Martinez announced a new rule governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims relating to advice 
about the immigration consequences of guilty pleas. Petitioner also contends that this new rule 
should apply retroactively to his case. 
8. Petitioner does not allege any other reason why the "interests of justice" should excuse his 
untimely filing. 
2 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The petition is untimely pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(l) (2002). The Post-
Conviction Remedies Act's statute of limitations expired on 15 March 2001 and petitioner did not 
file his petition until 13 May 2004. Therefore, petitioner can only proceed if he can satisfy the 
"interests of justice" exception found in section 78-3 5a-107(3). 
2. Petitioner fails, however, to satisfy the "interests of justice" exception. 
3. Contrary to petitioner's claim, Rojas-Martinez did not announce new rule. As the court of 
appeals recognized, Rojas-Martinez merely adopted "a commonly recognized exception to the rule" 
that an attorney's failure to inform a client of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea did not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 2003 UT App 203 at ^ 8 (emphasis added). 
4. In any event, even if Rojas-Martinez did announce a new rule that should be applied 
retroactively, petitioner has not alleged a violation of that rule. Counsel's advice that petitioner 
'"might be deported' but that [counsel] was not sure," did not affirmatively misrepresent the 
immigration consequences of petitioner's guilty plea. Therefore, counsel's advise in this case is 
distinguishable from the advice given in Rojas-Martinez. 
5. Whereas petitioner does not allege any other basis upon which this Court could find that 
the "interests of justice" should excuse his late filing, he fails to satisfy the exception. 




1. The State's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely is GRANTED. 
2. The petition is DISMISSED with prejudice. 
DATED /f October 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Rick S. Lundell 
Counsel for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on 27 September 20041 mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing 
proposed FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER DISMISSING 
PETITION, to Rick S. Lundell, Brian K. Lofgren, LUNDELL & LOFGREN, P.C, 136 South Main, 
Suite A-200, Salt Lake City, UT 84101, and further certify that as of 14 October 20041 have 
received no response. 
Christopher D. Ballard 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on September 17, 2004) 
3 THE COURT: Sergio Llamas Rodriguez versus, I guess, 
4 State of Utah. Let's start by having you state your appearances 
5 please. 
6 MR. BALLARD: Christopher Ballard on behalf of the 
7 s~ate of Utah. 
8 MR. LUNDELL: Your Honor, Rick Lundell on behalf of 
9 Sergio Llamas, and this is my law clerk. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Okay, we're here on the State's 
11 motion to dismiss the petition for extraordinary relief in this 
12 case. I've read everything that's been submitted, and by the 
13 way I thought the briefs on both sides were very good and I 
14 appreciate them. Where is the petitioner? 
15 MR. LUNDELL: Your Honor he's — he's in Farmington 
16 jail. He's an illegal re-entry (inaudible) so he's — what he 
17 has — right now is he has a federal trial and this is pending 
18 sentencing for the (inaudible) case. 
19 THE COURT: Why didn't we get him transported for this 
20 hearing? 
21 MR. LUNDELL: You know it's a civil hearing and whether 
22 — I mean if he wants (inaudible) record of it but I didn't 
23 necessarily consider it essential to our arguments. 
24 THE COURT: I see, so he has — he was deported 



























petition have on his incarceration? 
MR. LUNDELL: About two or three years. 
THE COURT: He would remain incarcerated regardless of 
whether this — 
MR. LUNDELL: Yes, your Honor. In federal law or 
federal sentencing guidelines if you're illegal re-entry they 
have the (inaudible) the guidelines, it's a two tier approach. 
The first tier has a base level. The base level of 
re-entry is an eight then it's a sixteen point enhancement for 
his particular crime, this particular underlying crime, so he's 
looking at a twenty-four point right now and then he has — and 
there's another tier, it's a second (inaudible) so now he has 
— well they use the same crime to give the enhancement the 
sixty-point enhancement and then they also use the same type of 
criminal history. 
So the possible criminal history and a possible 
(inaudible). So it's dramatic in terms of how much time he is 
serving. 
THE COURT: But he would serve time regardless of what 
happened in the conviction of this? 
MR. LUNDELL: Oh, yes. He's already — we had our 
federal trial, your Honor. Obviously it's pretty difficult to 
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1 prior crime and that's where he gets the enhancement. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Well, let me give you what my 
3 tentative thoughts are in this case. The basis for the motion 
4 to dismiss a statute of limitations in a state, of course, 
5 relies on the one-year statute of limitations and the Post 
6 Conviction Relief Act and this petition is clearly filed 
7 outside the one-year, so what we're really dealing with is the 
8 interest of justice exception to that. 
9 The petitioner claims in this case that under Julian, 
10 sbatue of limitations can never be constitutionally applied on 
11 a writ of habeas corpus and that's really based upon the Julian 
12 case and let me talk about how I read that case. 
13 What the Julian case says, and I'm reading from page 9 
14 based on my copy which is a lexis copy of the case is that, "If 
15 the proper showing is made the mere passage of time can never 
16 justify continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived of 
17 fundamental rights regardless of how difficult it may be to re-
18 prosecute that individual." 
19 It goes on to say, "This does not mean that a 
20 petitioner has an unconditional right to have his petition 
21 considered fully on the merits. It means only that the 
22 petitioner has a right to have the claims set forth in his 
23 petition reviewed by a judge for determination as to whether 
24 the petition warrants further proceedings or whether it should 
25 be dismissed for reasons set forth and Utah rules of civil 
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1 procedure governing petitions for extraordinary relief. 
2 If a statute of limitations alone could be applied to 
3 dismiss such a new petition a person who has spent years in 
4 prison who could show his innocence by new DNA evidence or 
5 confessions of others can never be exonerated and obtain 
6 freedom from wrongful incarceration." 
7 That language which is really dicta in the case I 
8 think applies really only to a person who is incarcerated on 
9 the conviction that we're talking about. 
10 If the petition for post conviction relief is in the 
11 form of a writ of habeas corpus, in other words if you grant 
12 the petition, the person is released from custody, then I think 
13 that those principles apply. 
14 But I think that the interest of justice exception is 
15 kind of a sliding scale. 
16 It doesn't take much in terms of the interest of 
17 justice if the person is incarcerated on the conviction but 
18 on the other hand if the person is not incarcerated on the 
19 conviction we're talking about, I think the petitioner has to 
20 come forward with a greater showing of interest of justice in 
21 order to be relieved from the statute of limitations. 
22 Now in this case I don't think that the petitioner has 
23 made that showing of the interest of justice. The petition is 
24 based upon the case of state of Utah vs. Rojas Martinez. 
25 In that case the petitioner or the defendant in that 
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1 case was affirmatively misrepresented by his counsel the 
2 immigration consequences of his plea. 
3 In that case the counsel said that if he entered a 
4 guilty plea to the charge that was contemplated, he might or 
5 he might not be deported which the Court of Appeals found to be 
6 a misrepresentation because it was absolutely clear under the 
7 circumstances that if the plea was entered the defendant would 
8 be deported. 
9 That is not the case that we have here. In this case 
10 the petitioner, and I'm going to cite from his affidavit said 
11 that he was told by Mr. Galvez — "Mr. Galvez told me that I 
12 might be deported but that he was not sure.'7 I think that 
13 statement falls short of an affirmative representation about 
14 the immigration consequences of a plea. 
15 The lawyer's really simply saying that the fact of 
16 deportation is a risk but that he doesn't know, and I think 
17 that that falls within the McFadden rule of a simple failure 
18 to advise of the immigration consequences of the plea. 
19 The immigration consequences are not misrepresented. 
20 The lawyer simply says he doesn't know which is like the same 
21 as saying nothing at all about the immigration consequences of 
22 a plea. 
23 The other basis for finding the interest of justice 
24 ir this case, even if Rojas Martinez apply was that it's a new 
25 rule and that isn't what Rojas Martinez says about the rule 
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1 that it's announcing. It says, "That it is a commonly 
2 recognized exception to this rule which is the rule of 
3 collateral consequences when a terminee affirmatively mis-
4 represents deportation consequences to his or her client. 
5 They view it as a commonly recognized exception to the 
6 collateral consequences rule. 
7 So for those reasons, I don't think that a case has 
8 been made out that relief from this conviction would be in 
9 the interest of justice. Having said all that is by way of 
10 tentative ruling. I'll hear from Mr. Lundell and give you a 
11 chance to change my mind. 
12 MR. LUNDELL: Thank you, your Honor. I appreciate 
13 that. If I may approach I have established (inaudible) cases. 
14 These are all the cases that — of — and we've included in our 
15 reply on the part of our presentation today. I feel a little 
16 uncomfortable up here and, your Honor, please, if I start to 
17 speak to quickly or mumble my words please remind me. I have 
18 a tendency to start speaking kind of quickly and excited. 
19 Your Honor, I appreciate your position in that the 
2 0 timeliness in terms that you have someone who's incarcerated 
21 and their habeas is based on that incarceration. 
22 Our case is very similar to that, your Honor. Our 
23 case where, in this situation our client has been deported and 
24 he will continue or he must stay out of the country obviously 
25 after he serves his time in the fed — in a -- at prison, 
1 whatever his time may be, we're looking at a range of, you 
2 know, approximately 25 to, you know, but honestly it's more of 
3 a 46 to a 53 month period. 
4 In particular with an underlying conviction, this 
5 one in particular, it does augment his sentence by double 
6 approximately. He would otherwise serve maybe even 12 months. 
7 In addition, your Honor, if this petition was — if 
8 the motion to dismiss was denied and we were able to go forward 
9 on a merits hearing we would be able to put Senior Galvez on 
10 the stand and I would request an evidentiary hearing because 
11 obviously this is based on affidavits and what I would call 
12 limited memory as well as Mr. Galvez will have limited memory 
13 I I'm sure, selective limited — selective limited memory. 
14 However it will allow us to move forward and to really 
15 determine what was told to my client. 
16 If we are able to meet our — well, I'm going to back 
17 up. If we were able to show in the interest of justice and 
18 overcome the statute of limitations and we're able to 
19 substantiate that this was a patent and this advice an 
2 0 ineffective system counsel we — and get this judgment vacated, 
21 we could reopen his immigration case. 
22 By opening his immigration case he at one point I will 
23 actually be able — he was a lawful permanent resident at one 
24 point in time. We can reopen his immigration case and start de 
25 novo on this case based on new evidence. 
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1 He does have two American children here, a wife, a 
2 house and this is his life. So I would strongly argue this is 
3 very similar to the case that you propose and effected this 
4 actual underlying conviction is what will keep him from ever 
5 being with his family because he knows this is the best place, 
6 the United States for his kids and for his wife and he would 
7 make the conscious choice of never coming back again just so 
8 they could have that luxury. 
9 Going into my argument we could see that the State — 
10 when I filed my petition, my client's petition, you know, 
11 interesting as to — and I probably should have initially filed 
12 it directly under the — under whether the rule should be 
13 applied retroactively. That's personally my error; I missed 
14 that completely, but we were able to, thanks to opposing 
15 counsel, he was able to bring it back around and really 
16 responded appropriately, I believe. 
17 The State conceded in it's memorandum that if we could 
18 show that Sergio Llamas' case was in the four corners of Rojas 
19 with the mis-advice exception that it would qualify or it would 
20 raise to the threshold of the interest of justice and satisfy 
21 the statute of limitations or step outside the statute of 
22 limitations. 
23 Your Honor, Rojas Martinez did announce a new rule and 
24 this is why. I'm going to back up and say, in announcing the 
25 new rule and, too, this rule should be applied retroactively to 
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1 save his case and interesting enough I believe that this case 
2 will be determined or should be determined on whether or not 
3 this Court decides to apply the federal guidelines to — or the 
4 federal rule to retroactivity or the state of Utah's Supreme 
5 Courts. 
6 If you decide to go with the State's suggestion of 
7 federal then I believe they will win. If you decide to go with 
8 the Supreme Court of this state then I believe that Sergio, my 
9 client, should win. 
10 Interesting enough, your Honor, the state of Utah is 
11 silent on this issue as to what is a new rule. In all of our 
12 research we did not necessarily find a Teeg analysis that would 
13 demonstrate how this State determines what is a new rule, 
14 totally silent. 
15 The Supreme Court has established a new rule but it's 
16 kind of — it's like they almost sidestepped any sort of — 
17 they didn't show the math, your Honor, and the two cases in 
18 particular are actually with the board of pardons that I'm 
19 referring to and the state of Utah necessarily just steps away 
20 from what is determined or what could be determined a new rule. 
21 Because it is silent on that I believe that we can and 
22 should go to federal law for some sort of guidance and this is 
23 sclely, your Honor, just to determine what is a new rule, 
24 Your Honor, under Teeg it states that "A new rule is 
25 determined by surveying the legal landscape," and I'm sure 
- 1 1 -
1 you've read this, your Honor, and I will move along quickly, 
2 "survey a legal landscape as it then existed and determine 
3 whether a state Court would have felt compelled by existing 
4 precedent to conclude that the rule he seeks was required by 
5 the constitution." 
6 The Teeg definition of what a new rule is really not a 
7 good definition. First because in the Teeg — in the Teeg 
8 case, your Honor, the United State Supreme Court is merely 
9 setting the standard for retroactivity and pretty much brushes 
10 over what is or should be deemed a new rule. 
11 It's not until we get to Lambrix, and I'm hoping I 
12 pronounciate that correctly, L-a-m-b-r-i-x, the Lambrix case, 
13 that the Supreme Court finally addresses as to what should be 
14 determined a new rule and Lambrix states that "After survey of 
15 the legal landscape whether the new rule was dictated by then 
16 existing president and apparent to all reasonable jurists," and 
17 this is real interesting, the language is very strong here, 
18 your Honor, with Lambrix it says, and I'm going to back up 
19 (inaudible), "After a survey," and this is how you determine 
2 0 if this is a new rule, "After a survey of the legal landscape 
21 whether the new rule is dictated by then existing president 
22 J and apparent to all reasonable jurists," basically saying, your 
23 I Honor, is if there is binding precedent or if it's apparent to 
24 all reasonable jurists you don't have a new rule, 
25 I However, where there is — excuse me and this is even 
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1 stronger, it goes where there is no other interpretation, no 
2 other interpretation is reasonable. 
3 Your Honor, the Court in Rojas Martinez itself stated 
4 this as a question of first impression. It had not decided 
5 this question. We had McFadden, of course, and McFadden just 
6 basically stood for a majority of what the districts held and 
7 that was that there is no affirmative duty — no affirmative 
8 j duty to notify your client of the threat of consequences. 
9 And only, your Honor, only in dicta does the state of 
10 — - does McFadden refer to affirmative misrepresentations; so at 
11 this point in time, your Honor, there is no rule. 
12 In fact, your Honor, at this point in time if we want 
13 to survey the legal landscape, and I appreciate opposing 
14 counsel having done some research here for us because I want to 
15 address this issue. 
16 Opposing Counsel in his reply memorandum to ours 
17 states that a survey of a legal landscape at the time 
18 petitioner's conviction became final in 1999 demonstrates 
19 — and this is from his writing that the holding of Rojas 
20 Martinez would have been apparent to all reasonable jurists. 
21 By 1999 only three federal circuit courts of appeal, 
22 five federal district courts and four states had recognized 
23 that Counsel's affirmative misrepresentation of the immigration 
24 consequences of a guilty plea may constitute ineffective 
25 assistance of Counsel. 
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1 Now this is some interesting language here, your 
2 Honor, and kudos to opposing Counsel for having treaded lightly 
3 here because this is what the facts are. 
4 Again at least three federal circuit courts of appeal 
5 as he states — well, we know we have thirteen so three of 
6 thirteen according to opposing Counsel, according to the state 
7 I should call them, the government, only three of thirteen 
8 have even addressed this issue that the district courts, five 
9 federal district courts, I believe there's about approximately 
10 200 had addressed this issue and four states out of 50 has 
11 addressed this issue. 
12 But it*gets even more interesting, your Honor, because 
13 the cases that the government cites, the State cites in 
14 particular the United States vs. Campbell dicta Counsel's 
15 affirmative (inaudible) provide a case list for your Honor, 
16 Counsel's affirmative misrepresentation in response to a 
17 specific inquiry from the defendant may however under certain 
18 circumstances costed ineffective assistance of Counsel. 
19 In fact let me back up here. Your Honor, United 
2 0 States vs. Campbell mentions this in dicta and it hasn't held 
21 it, so it might be there and this was according to the survey 
22 of 1999 what was available to my client in terms of relief for 
23 this sort of misrepresentation. 
24 Two, United States vs. Russell, it's the government in 
25 this situation, your Honor, that is misrepresented, the plea, 
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the consequences of the plea. Not his own — not his own 
attorney. This shouldn't even be included. 
United States vs. Santos Leese denying petitioner — 
it says alleging petitioner — petitioner alleging ineffective 
assistance of Counsel because it did not allege affirmative 
misstatement of pleas consequences. 
Again, your Honor, this is not beholding of United 
States vs. Santos Leese as dicta once again. United States 
(inaudible) they're on point here. Counsel's affirmative 
misrepresentation regarding the deportation of consequences of 
a guilty plea is unreasonable under prevailing professional 
norms . 
The United States vs. Mora Gomez, they're still 
undecided. They're saying we don't know. We're split. We 
don't know whether or not an affirmative misrepresentation is 
ineffective assistance of Counsel. 
Chabora vs. United States, in the absence of an 
affirmative misrepresentation Counsel's (inaudible) form a 
defendant of the immigration consequences of the plea does not 
amount to ineffective assistance of Counsel dicta. 
Most, of course, treat a lawyer's affirmative 
misrepresentations in response — I'm sorry this is also 
United Sates vs. George, most courts treat a lawyer's 
affirmative misrepresentation response to a specific inquiry 
from an alien client has at least potentially qualified for 
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1 ineffective assistance treatment depending on all of the 
2 circumstances. Again, your Honor, dicta. 
3 There are certain nuances here, your Honor, and this 
4 is I think where we will definitely disagree with the State and 
5 I definitely take a different stance than your position. 
6 Once — and — well, let me get through this and then 
7 I'll hit that point. Villa Venda vs. State, Florida Court of 
8 Appeals deny the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of 
9 Counsel, but recognizing that the situation might be different 
10 if the attorney made affirmative misrepresentations about the 
11 defendant's future immigration status. Again, your Honor, 
12 dicta. 
13 People vs. Correll now this is the one case that's 
14 solid and it says in view of the erroneous and misleading 
15 advice on the crucial consequence of deportation the defendants 
16 plea of guilty were not intelligent and knowingly made and 
17 therefore were not voluntary. 
18 This case held this, your Honor, saying that it 
19 must be unequivocal — it must be — and this is I think the 
20 position you are making, if you are — well this goes a step 
21 further, it says no, you will not be deported if you plead 
22 guilty. This is one of those cases, yes, that is ineffective 
23 assistance of Counsel. 
24 Again, your Hon — I just want to bring us back to the 
25 time line. This is back when my client was pleading guilty to 
-16-
1 this case, to this charge. Williams vs. State, or I have it 
2 down as State vs. Williams, the State says it is our firm 
3 belief that the consequences of deportation, whether labeled 
4 collateral or not is of sufficient seriousness that it 
5 constitutes ineffective assistance of attorney to fail to 
6 advise a non-citizen defendant of the deportation consequences 
7 of a guilty plea. 
8 Your Honor, this isn't even on point as to affirmative 
9 iris-advice and I'm going somewhere with this because I'm going 
10 to bring this full circle. 
11 And then your Honor, in re Washington State says, "An 
12 affirmative," this is again and I'm — this is what they've 
13 stated, "An affirmative misrepresentation to a defendant 
14 regarding a possibility of deportation might constitute," might 
15 constitute, "a manifest in justice and has provided a base for 
16 setting aside a guilty plea." That, your Honor, is the closest 
17 holding that we have to — most likely to Rojas Martinez. 
18 Then the State goes on to actually mention that two 
19 older cases and you've read this and I won't spend too much 
20 time on it, they held that a guilty plea was valid even if 
21 Counsel did misinform the consequences of immigration. 
22 However, your Honor, also the law stated, your Honor, 
23 that the exception that you're referring to is not always an 
24 exception and I would dare think — I would dare say that if we 



























would — that it would be prevailing. However, your Honor — 
THE COURT: Well, the real — I mean the real issue 
that I have in this case is whether he falls within Rojas 
Martinez. 
MR. LUNDELL: And that's — and that's what I'm going 
to quickly address here. 
THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this question. 
If Mr. Galdez had simply said when he was asked about the 
immigration consequences, "I don't know," does that fall 
within Rojas Martinez? 
MR. LUNDELL: Your Honor, it's — one second. No, your 
Honor, it actually — it actually if — if he asks, if anyone 
asks their attorney what their immigration consequences are, at 
that point in time there is a duty to provide that information. 
For example — 
THE COURT: Where do you get that from Rojas Martinez? 
MR. LUNDELL: I get that from Rojas Martinez because 
Rojas Martinez says, "You might or might not be deported." 
THE COURT: Which they took as an affirmative 
misrepresentation. I could have argued it either way but 
their view of that language was that it misrepresented the 
immigration consequences because it sounded like there was a 
chance he would not be deported, that it was optional and 
because deportation was mandatory to say "Might or might not," 
misrepresented the State of the law. But if he says, I don't 
- 1 8 -
1 know." That's not a misrepresentation. 
2 MR. LUNDELL: Well, actually — I see your point there 
3 your Honor an nI don't know" is not a misrepresentation but 
4 at that point in time there's an affirmative duty for him to 
5 provide the client — 
6 THE COURT: Okay, if that's the rule that if a client 
7 asks that it's ineffective assistance of Counsel not to provide 
8 the information, you've got to give me authority for that. 
9 It's got to be in Rojas Martinez. 
10 MR. LUNDELL: Okay — let me grab my — 
11 THE COURT: Because I don't think it goes that far. I 
12 think it's limited to where you misrepresent. 
13 MR. LUNDELL: Well, and I think we're — it's word play 
14 now, your Honor because whether — 
15 THE COURT: But these are significant because — 
16 MR. LUNDELL: They are —-
17 THE COURT: We're talking about the difference between 
18 telling somebody something that's wrong and saying, "I don't 
19 know," and it comes down to the words that were spoken. 
2 0 MR. LUNDELL: True and that — but this —- that was 
21 rry point exactly. There is a — the rule, your Honor, is an 
22 affirmative misrepresentation of the law. 
23 There are cases out there that have held that — and 
24 the language is interesting because I don't necessarily see a 
25 clear distinction between might or might not versus might but 
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1 I'm not sure. 
2 That's the exact same message to your client in 
3 particular when you're — let me back up on that, in particular 
4 when you're representing them and you're representing them in a 
5 plea bargain which very well could be an aggravated felon and a 
6 felony which would have him deported immediately mandatory for 
7 the rest of their lives. 
8 Let me back up on an issue there because, your Honor, 
9 actually you raised a great point and I want to address this 
10 and I see where you're hanging your hat, your Honor, and I 
11 appreciate that. I've actually — and it's interesting because 
12 I've actually read the case to be but I see your position on 
13 it. I've read the case to be a little bit broader but this is 
14 why I've read it to be so broad, your Honor. 
15 Under the ABS standards of criminal justice — 
16 THE COURT: You're reading from Rojas Martinez? 
17 MR. LUNDELL: No, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Oh, okay. Go ahead. 
19 MR. LUNDELL: Okay. Under the ABS standards — and I 
20 will come back — I will come back to Rojas Martinez because 
21 this is where I tie it in. ABS standards for criminal justice 
22 explicitly require defense counsel to explore collateral 
23 consequences with a client as part of representation and a 
24 guilty plea. This is standard 14-3.20, well actually standard 
25 14-3.20 explains, "To the extent possible defense counsel 
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1 should determine and advise the defendant sufficiently in 
2 advance of the entry of any plea as to the possible collateral 
3 consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated 
4 plea." 
5 Now this is how it ties into Rojas Martinez, your 
6 Honor. Rojas Martinez — and it's funny because I had — and 
7 this is an issue I'll raise later on — I was actually more 
8 concerned about the procedural bar that the State brought up 
9 later on at the end of their brief, but Rojas Martinez refers 
10 to — let me go there — refers to INS (inaudible) and it's 
11 granted, your Honor, it's footnote No. 3. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. LUNDELL: Do you have Rojas Martinez before you, 
14 vour Honor? 
15 THE COURT: I do. 
16 MR. LUNDELL: It's beginning on page 970, footnote 
17 No. 3. I'm going to read the sentence before thab. "Under this 
18 exception we conclude that an affirmative misrepresentation by 
19 Counsel as to the deportation of consequences of a guilty plea 
20 is today objectively unreasonable." 
21 This makes particular sense in light of the Supreme 
22 Court's recent analysis in INS vs. (inaudible). Citing the 
23 amicus brief of the National Association of Criminal Offense 
24 Lawyers, the Court noted that "Even if the defendant were not 
25 initially aware, possible waiver of deportation of the 
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1 immigration of Internationality Acts prior to 12-C," and I'll 
2 come back and explain that, your Honor, "competent defense 
3 counsel following the advice of numerous practice guides would 
4 have advised him concerning the provisions of importance.'7 
5 The Court also noted that the American Bar Association 
6 standard for criminal justice provide that, "If a defendant 
7 will face deportation as a result of conviction, defense 
8 counsel should fully advise defendant of these consequences. 
9 Further deportation, although collateral, is nonetheless a 
10 drastic consequence/' 
11 "In most cases this collateral consequence is more 
12 severe than the penalty imposed by the court in response to 
13 the plea. Because of this, an attorney's affirmative 
14 misstatement on the matter represents an objectively 
15 unreasonable deficiency." 
16 I'm reading this footnote and I read INS (inaudible), 
17 your Honor, to impose obligations on an attorney that at 
18 the moment that your client inquires as to the collateral 
19 consequences of his immigration status in pleading guilty 
20 you have an affirmative duty to provide him with an accurate 
21 statement of the law, and if you don't you have effectively — 
22 you have effectively provided an affirmative misstatement of 
23 the law, and this is why, your Honor. 
24 There are charges out there. There are — where if 
25 you are found guilty you will be deported as an aggravated 
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1 felon and some of these charges are relatively simple; a 
2 class A misdemeanor for 365 days. Someone could be charged 
3 with a 3rd degree felony, plead down, not know any better and at 
4 the moment in time they would be deported. 
5 Because, your Honor, because there is — and I want to 
6 come back to 2-12(c), at one point in time an aggravated felon 
7 had relief from being deported under the 2-12(c) waiver but 
8 that's been removed. It is now immediate, imminent and 
9 mandatory. 
10 But by not providing them with that information, you 
11 have affirmatively misstated the law, especially in particular 
12 when they don't re — or when they request or they inquire as 
13 to the consequences — the immigration consequences of them 
14 pleading guilty. 
15 And another point I wanted to point out, your Honor. 
16 In many cases an affirmative misrepresentation runs the gamut. 
17 It can be from — it can run from I don't know to might or 
18 might not or I — 
19 THE COURT: "I don't know" is never a misrepresentation 
20 of the immigration consequences. It may be a misrepresentation 
21 if a lawyer in fact does know — 
22 MR. LUNDELL: Uh-huh. 
23 THE COURT: Simply not saying, but it's never a 
24 misrepresentation. 
25 MR. LUNDELL: Okay. 
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1 THE COURT: You can't tell me that. 
2 MR. LUNDELL: Okay. Well, an affirmative 
3 misrepresentation is a term of art. That's what — that is the 
4 exception, your Honor. They're saying if there is no duty — 
5 and most jurisdictions hold there is no duty to disclose any 
6 consequences. 
7 An affirmative misrepresentation by Counsel is a term 
8 of art meaning they're not going to necessarily change the 
9 wording of affirmative misrepresentation to a quasi affirmative 
10 misrepresentation. 
11 It's a term of art and so to read such a — to take 
12 such a strict reading of what is an affirmative 
13 misrepresentation as to might or might not versus being more 
14 ambiguous as to he might but I'm not sure, is your not going — 
15 you can not necessarily change the wording of an affirmative 
16 misrepresentation. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from Mr. Ballard. 
18 MR. BALLARD: Your Honor, just a procedural matter 
19 before I begin with my argument. The rules make it clear the 
20 petitioner has a right to be here at a dispositive hearing. I 
21 think Counsel has implicitly waived his appearance. I just 
22 want to make that waiver explicit on the record. 
23 THE COURT: I don't think that there's anything that 
24 he can do. I mean only the client can waive his appearance. 
25 MR. BALLARD: Well, I believe Counsel could waive it 
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1 for him. 
2 THE COURT: I don't think so. 
3 MR. BALLARD: Okay. 
4 THE COURT: I think he should have been here. 
5 MR. BALLARD: Well, in any event I think, your Honor 
6 has correctly — 
7 THE COURT: Tell me if you think I'm wrong and I just 
8 want your honest opinion about the difference between this case 
9 and Rojas Martinez. If I'm up in the night tell me so but it 
10 doesn't seem to me that it's the same case. 
11 MR. BALLARD: It isn't the same case and your Honor's 
12 correctly analyzed that issue because saying, "I'm not sure," 
13 cr "I don't know," is not an affirmative misrepresentation and 
14 as the Court pointed out in Rojas Martinez, there is not an 
15 affirmative duty to advise your client of the collateral 
16 consequences of a guilty plea. 
17 Deportation is clearly collateral and in fact in Rojas 
18 Martinez the Court of Appeals said, "An attorney's failure to 
19 inform a client of the deportation consequences of a guilty 
20 plea without more does not fall below an objective standard of 
21 reasonables. There's no affirmative duty. If a client asks 
22 his attorney about the immigration consequences, the rule is 
23 that you cannot affirmatively misrepresent and that is not what 
24 happened in this case. 
25 But in any event this Court doesn't need to get into 
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1 whether Rojas Martinez applies and whether a petitioner has 
2 made out — or whether a petitioner has made out a case under 
3 Rojas Martinez because Rojas Martinez doesn't apply here. 
4 It's not a new rule that, your Honor has observed in Rojas 
5 Martinez the Court recognized that this exception of — for an 
6 affirmative misrepresentation it was a commonly recognized 
7 exception and in fact, petitioner himself in his petition 
8 admitted that he could have brought this claim at trial. 
9 Petitioner was on notice that there was an — a 
10 potential immigration issue. His trial counsel told him, "I 
11 don't know." In effect saying consult an immigration attorney 
12 which is precisely what happened in this case. 
13 Petitioner consulted an immigration attorney prior to 
14 sentencing. The immigration attorney told him, "You will be 
15 deported." and the petitioner proceeded on that basis rather 
16 than raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at 
17 that time or even in a timely petition for post conviction 
18 relief, he proceeded knowing that he would be deported and in 
19 fact asked the sentencing Court to release him to INS so he 
2 0 could be deported. 
21 This is not a new rule that applies retroactively. 
22 This was a rule that existed at the time the petitioner could 
23 have taken advantage of and did not and for those reasons his 
24 petition is untimely and even if this Court goes to the next 
25 step of the analysis of whether Rojas Martinez does apply and 
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1 petitioner has made out a case under Rojas Martinez he has not 
2 because there is no affirmative misrepresentation here. 
3 THE COURT: Well, the reason I think it's important 
4 even to the statute of limitations is because of the interest 
5 of justice exception and I think it's much harder to make out 
6 interest of justice if he doesn't fall within Rojas Martinez. 
7 That's my point. 
8 MR. BALLARD: Exactly. Unless the Court has any 
9 further questions the State (inaudible) — 
10 THE COURT: No other questions. Anything else 
11 Mr. Lundell? 
12 MR. LUNDELL: Yes, your Honor. This is (inaudible) 
13 Martinez right now is very premature. I'll tell you why, your 
14 Honor. What — and I understand your concern, but all we know 
15 is possibly what he may — or what he did tell my client. We 
16 don't have privy to all those conversations. 
17 THE COURT: Well, we can look at his petition, his 
18 affidavit and give him the benefit of every reasonable 
19 inference from what he says. He doesn't make out a claim 
20 into Rojas Martinez, then it seems to me that we can consider 
21 that in determining whether or not interest of justice require 
22 relief from the statute of limitations (inaudible). 
23 MR. LUNDELL: And this is my — or this is what I think 
24 would be fair, your Honor, is that we necessarily address the 
25 issues because in an evidentiary hearing, your Honor, we could 
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1 determine what really happened. What — everything that was 
2 told, because I have (inaudible) Galvez on the stand. It's 
3 very well that Galvez did tell my client that you might or 
4 might not get deported. But until I get him on the stand then 
5 I can only go and provide this Court with what my client has 
6 told me which was, "you might, but I'm not sure," sort of 
7 statement. 
8 So I believe by going into — I believe we've made a 
9 prima facie meeting of Rojas Martinez but now we necessarily 
10 need to look at whether or not there's a new rule and if it 
11 should be retroactively applied assuming, of course, after the 
12 evidentiary hearing that we have met that burden and we have 
13 fallen squarely within Rojas Martinez. 
14 There is a — and I'm trying to remember Isom — there 
15 was — when Sergio Llamas was sentenced he submitted a letter. 
16 I thought I'd included it with the petition but maybe I didn't 
17 because I didn't include the petition. He submitted a letter 
18 to the Court on sentencing saying that if I plead, my attorney 
19 says I might not get deported. Otherwise I will get deported. 
2 0 I'm proffering that at this moment in time but in 
21 terms of a motion to dismiss which is an awfully harsh, you 
22 know, because it was a harsh remedy when we can actually go to 
23 the merits of this case. You know, it's very possible that, 
24 you know, that Galvez did misrepresent the law and 
25 affirmatively misstated. 
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1 I In fact according to that letter, your Honor, it does 
2 -- his letter to the judge is that I've returned and I plan on 
3 -- done so because if you let me do the — I think it was the 
4 sex offender program, I might not get deported, as his attorney 
5 had advised him, which again is absolutely and completely 
6 inaccurate and, your Honor, is a misstatement of the law. 
7 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I am going to grant 
8 the motion to dismiss for the reasons I've already stated on 
9 the record. Mr. Ballard, prepare the order. 
0 MR. BALLARD: (Inaudible). 
1 THE COURT: We'll be in recess. 
2 (Hearing concluded) 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERGIO LLAMAS-
RODRIGUEZ 
(In Support of Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief) 
Civil No. 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn 
(Criminal Case No. 981910089FS) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Sergio Rodriguez-Llamas, the Petitioner of in the above-captioned matter, being at least 
eighteen years of age and of sound mind, duly swear and state as follows: 
1. I entered the United States of America in or around 1987. 
2. Prior to my deportation in 2000,1 lived in the United States for a total of 13 years and I 
worked at Albertson's North Salt Lake Distribution Center during the previous four years. 
MAY I 3 2004 
l 
3. My wife and I have two children. Both were born in the United States and are residents 
of the State of Utah, 
4. My two children, Lilibeth and Sergio, are currently ages 16 and 14, respectively. Lilibeth 
has been attending Tooele High School and Sergio is currently attending Tooele Junior High School. 
5. Prior to my deportation, I was active in my community and as a member of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. 
6. Being present in the United States of America together with my family is the most 
important part of my life. 
7. I have always considered the immigration consequences of any criminal activity to be the 
most important part of being convicted of any such criminal activity, such as by a guilty plea. 
8. On May 29, 1998, charges were filed against me for "SEX ABUSE OF A CHILD" 
pursuant to Utsih Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1, a Second Degree Felony, 
9. I have, at all times prior to my plea in June of 1999, unequivocally maintained that I am 
innocent of this charge. 
10. Prior to May 29, 1998,1 had no criminal history other than minor traffic violations. 
11. Prior to pleading guilty on June 30,1999,1 asked my attorney, Jorge Galvez whether I 
would be deported if I were to plead guilty to the stepped-down chai'ge of "ATTEMPTED SEX ABUSE 
OF A CHILD." 
12. Mr. Galvez told me that I "might be deported" but that he was not sure. 
13. Mr. Galvez then told me that if I did not accept the plea bargain and the I lost at trial, that I 
would go to prison for a period of up to fifteen years and as a result, I would be separated from my family. 
2 
14. Mr. Galvez then told me that I did not have a good chance of winning at trial. 
15. Based on Mr. Galvez' legal advice that I accept the plea bargain to avoid going to prison and 
to avoid separation from my family and his advice that I only "might" be deported, I plead guilty to 
"ATTEMPTED SEX ABUSE OF A CHILD", a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-404.1. 
16. I would not have plead guilty to the foregoing criminal charge if I knew that I was 
pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony" and that I would be subject to automatic deportation under 
federal immigration law. Rather, I would have insisted on going to trial to prove my innocence. 
C^&V* ($m*&^ 
Sergio Llamas 
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MAY 1 3 2004 
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Deputy Clerk 
VS. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNFY, 
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(In Support of Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief) 
Civil No, 
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SS 
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( 1 O'linlcs i lamas, heiiw at least nijlilcni \t\ns of'ai'e and id -uiumd mind, duh MUMI nidi "ilalc as 
follows: 
1. I a m the wife of Sergio I lamas-R odriguez ("Sergio"), the Petitioner in this matter. 
2 Ve have two children, both born in the State of I Tiah in the United States of America. 
3. ..-. present each and every time Sergio met with his attorney,. Jorge Galvez. 
4. Jntil June 30, 1999, Sergio has always maintained that he ^ as : \^ >, - * « . • ' 
1 
d 
"sex abuse of a child.". 
5. 1 was present on June 30,1999 when Mr. Galvez told Sergio that Sergio "might" be 
deported for pleading guilty to the charge of "ATTEMPTED SEX ABUSE OF A CHILD", a third 
degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1. 
6. Mr. Galvez told Sergio that Sergio did not have a good chance of winning at trial. 
7. Mr. Galvez also told Sergio that if Sergio did not accept the plea bargain and lost at trial, 
that Sergio would go to prison for up to fifteen years. 
8. 1 would have never supported my husband pleading guilty to any criminal charge that is 
considered an "'aggravated felony" under federal immigration law that would subject him to automatic 
deportation. 
piqxrls $, rJA* tfsCU^ . 
Lourdes Llamas 
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